

DNS Caching: Running on Zero

Saleem Bhatti
School of Computer Science
University of St Andrews



University
of
St Andrews

(Non-)Effectiveness of DNS caching

- Jung, J., Sit, E., Balakrishnan, H., and Morris, R. 2002. *DNS performance and the effectiveness of caching*. IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking. Vol. 10, No. 5 (Oct. 2002), pp. 589-603.
- DNS caching has reduced effectiveness for edge sites:
 - **trace-driven emulation** (no experiments)
 - **A records could have low TTL (e.g. below 1000s)**
 - **such low TTL would have low impact on DNS load**

DNS experiments at StA [1]

- Experiments in Q4/2009
- Modify TTL values of records in operational DNS server at School of CS, St Andrews
 - 4 DNS servers: Windows ActiveDirectory
 - ~400 DNS clients: Windows, Linux, MacOSX, BSD
- TTL values for successive **7-day periods** during normal semester:
 - changed DNS TTL on ActiveDirectory
 - TTL values used: **1800s, 30s, 15s, 0s**
- Configured clients not to cache.

DNS experiments at StA [2]

- Passive collection of packets via port mirror:
 - *tcpdump(8)* targeting *port 53*
 - Captured all DNS packets
- Results shown on following slides are for:
 - **A record requests** for **servers** only during the capture period (relevant to ILNP, and less ‘noisy’ data)
 - using 1 second buckets
- Basic statistics:
 - on time-domain data
- Spectral analysis:
 - examination of request rates
- Analysis: home-brew *python* scripts, NumPy package

2009: Basic dataset meta-data


Data set name	TTL [s]	Duration [s] ¹	Total DNS packets captured ²	Number of A record requests for 67 servers ³
dns1800	1800	601,200	41,868,522	2,004,133
dns30	30	601,200	71,105,247	2,648,796
dn15	15	601,200	56,472,027	3,240,675
dns0	0	601,200	55,868,573	4,501,590

¹ from tcpdump timestamps, rounded to nearest second, 7 days = 604,800 seconds, less 3600s temporal guard band for TTL value changes = 601,200 seconds


² includes all request and response packets to/from port 53 (TCP and UDP), including erroneous requests, retransmissions etc

³ servers that were active during the 4 weeks of data capture


dns1800: A record requests TTL=1800s




dns30: A record requests TTL=30s



dns15: A record requests TTL=15s



dns0: A record requests TTL=0s



2009 Summary of basic statistics

Data set name	Mean [reqs/s]	Median [reqs/s]	Std Dev [reqs/s]	Maximum [reqs/s]
dns1800	3.33	3	3.47	183
dns30	4.41	4	4.27	261
dns15	5.39	4	4.85	123
dns0	7.49	7	4.93	369


60x drop in TTL values results in
1/3x increase in A record requests.
0 TTL gives (only) **2 1/4x increase**.

2009 Basic spectral analysis


- Create approximate periodogram by counting occurrences of bucket sizes:
 - have used 1s bucket
 - so size of bucket is number of requests/s
- Comparison of periodogram:
 - shows changing dynamics of request rates
 - gives a better view of the trends in request rates

2009 periodograms: 1800s ...







7-day DNS A record query rates, dns2009-1800



7-day CDF for DNS A record query rates, dns2009-1800



... 30s, 15s, 0s



What is possible if DNS TTL is zero?

- Frequent, authenticated DNS updates:
 - Very useful for mobility/multi-homing aspects of ILNP
 - Location updates in DNS give changes in connectivity
 - Simulated by Pappas, Hailes, & Giaffreda, published in LCS 2002
- Load balancing and VM mgmt for data centres
- Edge-site based multi-path and TE control options:
 - multiple Locator values and DNS L record preferences
- Help defend against certain network attacks:
 - DNS cache poisoning for end-sites (that do not use DNSSEC)
 - DDoS: fast-cycle multi-homing (i.e. a kind of “fast-flux” DNS for defence rather than attack)

Who would set DNS TTLs so low?

- Real **A** record values for some services:
 - TTL = 60 seconds: yahoo
 - TTL = 20 seconds: akamai
 - **TTL = 0 seconds: St Andrews, Computer Science**
- Note that a site would **NOT** set low TTLs for:
 - Its own **NS** records, which identify its DNS servers.
 - The **A** records related to its **NS** records.
 - **A, CNAME, PTR** records for services, e.g. email **MX**
 - A (mobile) site can make remote some or all of its authoritative DNS servers; some sites do so today.

Summary and Conclusion

- Summary:
 - Zero TTL values for edge-site DNS records possible
 - DNS load with zero DNS TTLs seems manageable
- Conclusion:
 - Frequent DNS accesses (low TTL) seem practical
- Future work:
 - impact of the use of Secure DNS Dynamic Update and cryptographic authentication of DNS look-ups
- **A Very Big Thanks to:**
 - **the Sys Admin Group at cs.st-andrews.ac.uk for implementing DNS TTL changes**

dig – hosts at cs.st-andrews.ac.uk

adnams

marston

wells

youngs

hopback

innis

gunn

mcmullen

mightyoak

greatoakley

threebs

morrel

brakspear

ringwood